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I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Smith is the CEO of Alphabet Corporation. One day at the
Utopia Country Club, Mr. Smith sees two of his employees who
also happen to be members of the same club. Feeling
confrontational, he approaches Stephanie, an employee of
Alphabet Corporation, and punches her in the face for being a
woman. He then finds John, another employee of Alphabet
Corporation whom he knows complained to the company's
grievance department about sexual harassment of women in the
workplace, and punches him in the face because of his complaint.'
The former scenario is not within the scope of Title V112 as it is not
work-related and thus does not alter Stephanie's "terms and
conditions of employment."3 The latter scenario, however, could
possibly be actionable under the United States Supreme Court's
recent interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
Seems counterintuitive, doesn't it?
Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from retaliating
against an employee who participates in Title VII processes or who
opposes workplace discrimination protected under the statute.4 In
order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) he or she engaged in protected activity; (2) he
or she experienced some adverse employment action; (3) the
employer knew about the employee's protected activity; and (4) a
causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.5
Over the years, the courts have struggled with how to define
"adverse employment action." The courts eventually adopted three
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2006).
3. Id. at 41.
4. § 2000e-3(a).
5. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir.
2002).
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standards: (1) an "ultimate employment decision" such as "hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating,",6 (2) a
"materially adverse change in the terms and conditions" of
employment,7 and (3) materially adverse treatment that might well
have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination." 8 The majority of courts, regardless of
the standard adopted, agreed that the employer's adverse action
needed to be employment-related to be actionable.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in addition to Louisiana
state courts, adopted the strictest standard of the three-the
"ultimate employment action" standard. 9 In 2006, the Supreme
Court, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White,
decided that the appropriate standard for the adverse employment
action prong is any materially adverse action that might well "have
'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination."" 10 In addition to adopting the most
lenient standard of the three, the Supreme Court decided that the
adverse treatment need not be employment-related at all. The
Court also indicated that the "reasonableness" requirement has
both subjective and objective elements."
The Court was reasonable in its interpretation of § 704(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; however, the statute is now too
broad. Because the standard recognizes that retaliation can come
in many forms and thus requires a case-by-case analysis, it will be
virtually impossible for employers to gauge their behavior. It will
be difficult to deter employers from retaliating if they have no
indication as to what is and what is not considered prohibited
behavior. Because even relatively minor actions by an employer
could deter a victimized employee from complaining, summary
judgment will virtually be eliminated and the costs of litigation
6. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995)).
7. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)).
8. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
9. See, e.g., Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708; Berry v. City of Bossier City, 911
So. 2d 333, 342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005); Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, 851
So. 2d 1194, 1203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003).
10. 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
11. Id. at 2409, 2415.
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will rise dramatically. Furthermore, the Burlington standard will
likely be applied beyond the Title VII arena as courts tend to look
to Title VII decisions for guidance on how to interpret anti-
retaliation provisions in other contexts. 12  Finally, such an
interpretation makes the anti-retaliation provision much broader
than the underlying discrimination provision-the heart and soul of
Title VII. Such a result provides more protection to bystanders
who simply complain or oppose the Title VII protected behavior
than those who actually experience discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
' 3
Part II of this Note discusses the background of Title VII
leading up to the 2006 decision in Burlington. Part III provides a
brief summary of the relevant facts and reasoning surrounding the
Burlington majority and concurring decisions. Part IV discusses
the gradual broadening of Title VII retaliation, the reasonableness
of the Court's interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, and
the ramifications of the Court's decision on the business world and
on present day litigation. Part V contains suggestions on how to
temper the broad interpretations adopted in the Burlington decision
and other retaliation cases. Part VI concludes by recommending
that Congress amend § 704 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
clarify what type of "discrimination" is within the scope of the
provision.
II. THE RETALIATION SCENE PRIOR TO BURLINGTON
Title VII's main provision prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee because of the employee's
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 14 However, Title
12. For example, ADA, ADEA, FLSA, and ERISA all have similar anti-
retaliation provisions. See Michael Rusie, The Meaning of Adverse Employment
Actions in the Context of Title VII Retaliation Claims, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
379, 383-84 (2002).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). See, for example, the introductory
hypothetical supra Part I.
14. Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
2008] 1027
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VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees
that have opposed discriminatory behavior protected under the
main provision.15  Any claim in retaliation begins with alleged
conduct that is protected under the main provision-§ 703(a). 16
Next, an employee decides to protest the discrimination in some
way-either formally or informally. 17  After an "employee has
'opposed' unlawful discrimination in the workplace or has
'participated' in any process or investigation directed against such
discrimination," Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating
against that employee.' 8 Therefore, the anti-retaliation provision
(§ 704(a)) ensures that an employee's rights under the main
provision of Title VII are fully protected.19
A. Proving Discriminatory Intent
In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, an employee must
prove discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. The
plaintiff can establish this intent by direct or circumstantial
evidence. In cases involving direct evidence, the plaintiff must
simply establish a prima facie case of retaliation. In order to
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
15. Section 2000e-3(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment
... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in-any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.
16. Justin P. O'Brien, Weighing Temporal Proximity in Title VII Retaliation
Claims, 43 B.C. L. REv. 741, 744 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
17. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 744. An example of a formal complaint is
filing a charge with the EEOC. An example of an informal complaint is
complaining about the discrimination directly to the employer. Id.
18. Id. at 745. The two clauses of the anti-retaliation provision are referred
to as the "opposition clause" and the "participation clause."
19. Id. ("Protecting employees from employment discrimination, after all,
would be meaningless if an employer could simply fire an employee who sought
to protest discriminatory behavior.").
20. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show:
"(1) a statutorily protected conduct; (2) an adverse employment
action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the
protected conduct." 21 Further, all circuits require the plaintiff to
prove that the employer knew of the employee's protected activity;
however, some circuits explicitly list this as a fourth element to the
prima facie case.22 Very rarely is direct evidence of discriminatory
intent available. As a result, courts have adopted the burden-
shifting approach created by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green23 to assist in weighing circumstantial
evidence of intent.24
First, the plaintiff must make a showing of a prima facie
case of retaliation. If the plaintiff's showing is sufficient,
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action taken against
the plaintiff. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated
reason for the adverse action is actually a pretext for
retaliation.
E5
Thus the establishment of a prima facie case of retaliation
results in a presumption of discriminatory intent, which the
employer is able to rebut if the employer succeeds in providing a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action.
E6
21. Reis v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1252
(M.D. Fla. 2006). See also Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863 (4th
Cir. 2001); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997);
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997).
22. See White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 449 (6th
Cir. 2002).
23. 411 U.S. 792.
24. See Burlington, 310 F.3d at 449 (6th Cir. 2002); Linda M. Glover, Title
VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38
Hous. L. REv. 577, 612 (2001). How and when the McDonnell Douglas
analysis can be applied may be subject to debate after the Supreme Court's
decision in Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
25. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 746.
26. Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (lth Cir.
1997).
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B. Dispute in the Circuits over the Proper "Adverse Employment
Action " Standard
Over the past four decades, the federal circuits have struggled
with interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. Even though
"the anti-retaliation clause on its face contains no requirement that
the discrimination be with respect to terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment," most circuits have interpreted § 704 to
27require an adverse employment action. However, the circuits
varied greatly as to what was considered severe enough to
constitute an adverse employment action. Unfortunately, the
legislative history of Title VII provides little guidance other than
the idea that "[management] prerogatives . . . are to be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." 28  Because of the
unclear statutory language and the negligible legislative history
surrounding the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, the
federal circuits adopted three different interpretations of adverse
employment action.
The most conservative of the circuits provided redress only
where the employer's actions met the level of "ultimate
employment action." 29 An ultimate employment action is limited
to actions such as "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting,
and compensating." 30 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits are the only
two that have utilized this standard.31 The majority of circuits did
not accept this view because it allowed "too much latitude to
employers to retaliate against employees in ways that are not as
easily cognizable as a hiring, firing, or demotion."
32
27. Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J.
1121, 1133 (1998).
28. Additional Views on H.R. 7152, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2487, 2516; Joan M. Savage, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach
to the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII
Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REv. 215, 220 (2004).
29. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006).
30. Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.
1997)).
31. Id. Louisiana state court decisions also adopted the "ultimate
employment standard" of the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Bossier
City, 911 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2005); Alcom v. City of Baton Rouge,
851 So. 2d 1194 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003).
32. Rusie, supra note 12, at 400. That is, employers knew they could
retaliate as long as they did not act in a way that could be considered an
1030 [Vol. 68
The majority of circuits required there to be a "'materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. 33
Under this standard, an employee can recover for employer actions
that fall short of ultimate employment actions, but are still
significant enough to limit employer liability.
34
The final standard, based on the EEOC's recommendation, had
two variations. In both the Seventh Circuit and District of
Columbia Circuit, "the plaintiff must show that the 'employer's
challenged action would have been material to a reasonable
employee [and that] it would likely have 'dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."'
35
The Ninth Circuit adopted the slightly broader EEOC standard
which states that "the plaintiff must simply establish 'adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in
protected activity."' 36 While the wording of these two standards
differs, the consequences of their application is similar, if not
identical.37
In order to decide the appropriate "adverse employment action"
standard, and thereby resolve the circuit split, the United States
"ultimate employment action." For example, in DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun.
Police Officers' Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995), the court found that an
office newsletter containing articles ridiculing an employee because of her
complaints to the EEOC was not an adverse employment action.
33. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting White v. Burlington & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004)).
34. Rusie, supra note 12, at 389.
35. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11 (quoting Washington v. I11. Dep't of
Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
36. Id. at 2411 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
37. In fact, the EEOC cited cases from the Seventh and District of Columbia
Circuits when it indicated that the retaliation provision prohibits "any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter
the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity." Margery
Corbin Eddy, Finding the Appropriate Standard for Employer Liability in Title
VII Retaliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual
Harassment Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. REv. 361, 376 (1999) (quoting EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH), GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
6513 (1990)).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway v. White.
3 8
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sheila White was initially hired by Burlington Northern as a
track laborer, 39 a physically demanding job. After beginning her
employment, she filled an open position as forklift operator.
Around September 16, 1997, White complained to the company
about sexual discrimination by a foreman. After an investigation,
the company suspended the foreman without pay and ordered him
to attend sexual harassment classes. On the same day that the
foreman was suspended, one of the supervisors reassigned the
former forklift worker to his old job and returned White to the
position of track laborer. Burlington admitted that they made this
assignment because male employees had complained of White
receiving preferential treatment. Brown, the supervisor that
returned White to her former job, stated that he knew of the co-
employees' complaints prior to White's complaints of sexual
discrimination; however, he did not transfer White until she had
complained. The testimony of Burlington and supervisor Brown
was inconsistent. Burlington blamed the change on union
problems while Brown indicated that he could place anybody he
wanted into the forklift operator position.4 °
On October 10, 1997, White formally complained to the EEOC
about sexual discrimination and retaliation by Burlington. The
EEOC mailed the October 10 charge of discrimination to Brown
on December 8, 1997.41
Only three days after Brown received notification of White's
discrimination claim, one of White's supervisors removed White
from her position for insubordination. The incident leading to the
insubordination involved a dispute between the supervisor and
38. See Maria Greco Danaher, Standards for Defining Retaliation
Broadened, 8 No. 15 LAW. J. 3 (2006).
39. This position involves "removing and replacing track components,
transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spillage
from the right-of-way." Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
40. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 446-47 (6th
Cir. 2002).
41. Id. at 448.
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White over which vehicle White would ride to a work location.
The foreman contacted Brown for his guidance on how to handle
the situation; Brown then requested a fax describing the incident.
After receiving the foreman's fax, Brown indicated that White's
behavior justified her removal from the job.42 Burlington Northern
suspended White for thirty-seven days without pay during which
she invoked internal grievance procedures. The results of the
company's investigation indicated that White had not been
insubordinate. As a result, Burlington reinstated White and
awarded her thirty-seven days of back pay.43
White proceeded to file a Title VII claim against Burlington in
federal court in which she claimed that "(1) changing her job
responsibilities, and (2) suspending her for thirty-seven days
without pay---amounted to unlawful retaliation in violation of Title
VII.'44  The district court found for White on both claims of
retaliation. The Sixth Circuit panel first reversed, then, en banc,
reinstated the district court's decision. However the en banc court
could not agree on the appropriate standard to apply for the
"adverse employment action" prong of the prima facie stage.45
The Supreme Court then took the matter on certiorari in order
to decide the scope of the anti-retaliation provision-what is
considered an "adverse employment action" for purposes of a
retaliation claim?46 The court concluded that:
the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions
and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment
or occur at the workplace .... [T]he provision covers those
(and only those) employer actions that would have been
materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job
applicant. In the present context that means that the
employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they
could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.47
42. Id.
43. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
44. Id. at 2410.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2408. The Supreme Court's opinion was unanimous, with Justice
Alito filing a separate concurring opinion.
47. Id. at 2409.
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In reaching its decision, the Court went through the four
standards utilized by the federal circuits and concluded that the
Seventh Circuit's and District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation
was the most loyal to both the language and spirit of Title VII.
4 8
Burlington and the Solicitor General's argument that § 703(a)
and § 704(a) should be read in pari materia did not persuade the
Supreme Court. Since the anti-retaliation provision does not have
the same limiting language found in the anti-discrimination
provision, Congress probably intended for the courts to construe
the two provisions differently.49 The Court then clarified that the
purposes of the anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions
differ. In order to satisfy its objectives under the anti-
discrimination provision, "Congress did not need to prohibit
anything other than employment-related discrimination.
50
However, the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to
protect the employee's rights under the anti-discrimination
provision. If the anti-retaliation provision was limited to
employment-related actions, many forms of retaliation would be
allowed.5'
Burlington then argued that the anti-retaliation provision
should not provide greater protection to victims of retaliation than
those individuals "whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect."
52
The Court dismissed this argument by referring to other similar
statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act. Neither the
statutes themselves, nor the jurisprudence surrounding the NLRA
and the Title VII provisions contain any indication that the anti-
retaliation provision is limited to the activity described in the
primary discrimination provision.
53
48. Id. at 2410-11, 2415.
49. Section 703(a) makes it unlawful to "discriminate against an individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 704(a), on the
other hand, makes it unlawful for an "employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)
(emphasis added).
50. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412. "The substantive provision's basic
objective [is] 'equality of employment opportunities' and the elimination of
practices that tend to bring about 'stratified job environments .... ' Id.
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
51. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
52. Id, at 2414.
53. Id.
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After making it clear that the anti-retaliation provision is
broader than the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII, the
Court concluded by adopting the standard set forth by the Seventh
Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit.5 4 The Supreme Court
preferred this standard to the EEOC standard adopted by the Ninth
Circuit because the former has both a materiality requirement and a
reasonableness requirement. The "material adversity [requirement]
S.. is important to separate significant from trivial harms." 55 An
objectively reasonable employee standard is necessary to ensure
that the standard is judicially administrable. Even though the
Court adopted an objectively reasonable standard, it followed this
by stating that context matters-implicitly indicating that there is a
subjective element to the reasonableness test. Finally, in
determining whether a reasonable employee would be deterred, the
"standard does not require a reviewing court or jury to consider
'the nature of the discrimination that led to the filing of the
charge.' ' 57 Instead, the only thing to consider is the retaliatory
conduct itself.
After applying the standard to the facts of White's case, the
Court concluded that both the job reassignment and the thirty-
seven day suspension with back pay were sufficient to state a claim
in retaliation.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito agreed that the two actions by
Burlington constituted retaliation; however, he thought § 703(a)
and § 704(a) should be read together. While he admitted that his
interpretation was not the most obvious choice, he felt that it was
54. Id. at 2414-15 (expressly rejecting the "ultimate employment" standard
of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits).
55. Id. at 2415 (explaining that if an action is not materially adverse, it is
unlikely that it would have deterred an individual from complaining).
56. Id. (discussing how a "schedule change in an employee's work schedule
may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a
young mother with school age children").
57. Id. at 2416 (quoting id at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring)).
58. Id. Even though Burlington paid Ms. White back pay, the Court still
found her claim to be actionable. The Court explained this decision in reference
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows for both compensatory and
punitive damages. The Court felt that it would "undermine the significance of
that congressional judgment . . . to conclude that employers could avoid
liability" by paying back pay. Id. at 2417. The Court went on to state that "an
indefinite suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the
suspended employee eventually received backpay." Id.
2008] NOTES 1035
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much more reasonable than the approach taken by the majority.
Instead of adopting an interpretation that is true to the language of
the statute-allowing any difference in treatment to be
actionable-the majority adopted an interpretation that has no
basis in the statutory language. Justice Alito also criticized the
practical consequences of the standard. First, if courts are not
supposed to consider the underlying discrimination, as the majority
explicitly provides, how can a jury decide whether a reasonable
employee would be deterred from complaining about a given
discriminatory act? Second, what does "reasonable worker"
mean? The majority states that the standard is objective; however,
it then proceeds to discuss subjective elements such as age and
gender, which the courts may also consider. Just how many
individual characteristics would the Court allow?
59
IV. RETALIATION LAW: A RUNAWAY TRAIN
The following section discusses the gradual broadening of Title
VII retaliation, the reasonableness of the Court's interpretation of
the anti-retaliation provision in Burlington, and the ramifications
of the Court's decision on the business world and on present-day
litigation.
A. The Gradual Broadening of Title VII Retaliation
Broad interpretation in the retaliation area is not limited to the
"adverse employment action" standard; the courts have stretched
almost every element needed to establish a prima facie claim in
retaliation to its limits.60 The following gives a brief overview of
retaliation standards that the courts have broadly interpreted in the
past. These areas are still hotly debated and could possibly be
considered by the Supreme Court in the future.
59. Id. at 2419-21 (Alito, J., concurring).
60. See supra Part II.A.
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1. Protected Activity
Section 704(a) recognizes two variations of protected
activity.61 The provision prohibits an employer from retaliating
against an employee: "because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]."62
The former clause is often referred to as the "opposition
clause," while the latter clause is referred to as the "participation
clause. 63  Thus, if an employee can show that he complained
about discriminatory conduct to his employer (opposed) or filed a
claim himself (participated), there is little question that the
employee meets the protected activity prong of the prima face
case. However, not all employee actions fall perfectly into one of
these two scenarios.
The opposition clause generally protects a broader array of
employee activities than does the participation clause. For
example, if an employee pickets or writes an article to the
newspaper complaining about their employer's actions, he has
"opposed" discrimination for purposes of Title VII.64 However,
the "employee must have a good faith belief that the opposed
employer conduct was discriminatory," which ensures that not just
anybody can "oppose" for purposes of Title VII recovery. 6
5
While it has long been understood that the opposition clause
provides a broad range of protection, the same was not always so
for the participation clause. Many thought that to "participate" for
purposes of Title VII, an individual either had to file a claim with
the EEOC himself or had to testify voluntarily in support of
another employee's claim. At least one case has cast this belief
into doubt. In Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company, Mr. Merritt
sexually harassed a woman and was later called to give deposition
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
62. Id.
63. Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses?
Unlawful Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It
When They See It?, 14 LAB. LAW. 373, 378 (1998).
64. Savage, supra note 28, at 222.
65. Id. See also Gilooly v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Serv., Div. of
Senior Serv., 421 F.3d 734, 742 (8th Cir. 2005).
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66testimony in her sexual harassment case. His truthful testimony
helped the plaintiffs case; however, Mr. Merritt was adverse to the
plaintiffs cause the entire time.67  The court read the statutory
language literally and found that "participated in any manner"
included involuntary deposition testimony.
Even in cases where an employee has not yet filed a claim with
the EEOC, but the employer retaliates in anticipation of the
employee doing so, courts have found that the employee
"participated" for purposes of Title VII.
69
In addition, some courts have found that a claimant need not be
in good faith in order to "participate" within the meaning of Title
VII. 70 In other words, a claimant could file a completely
fraudulent or frivolous claim of discrimination and still be
71 72protected.   Fortunately, most courts reject this expansive view.
For example, the Seventh Circuit requires the same good faith
standard under both the opposition and participation clauses of
Title VII.73
66. 120F.3d 1181, l182(llthCir. 1997).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1186; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). However, the facts indicate
that the employer fired Mr. Merritt because of his damning testimony, not
because he sexually harassed a co-employee. Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1183.
While the court indicates that its decision would have been different if the
employer had fired the employee because of the harassment and not the
deposition testimony, this provides little consolation. Employers will be much
more reluctant to fire a sexually harassing employee once that individual has
given deposition testimony out of fear that their actions will look retaliatory. Id.
at 1188-89.
69. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993);
Croushorn v. Bd. of Trs., 518 F. Supp. 9, 24 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). This result
clearly goes against the language of the statute. The employee has done nothing
that could be construed under the statute as "participation."
70. Gilooly, 421 F.3d at 742 (Colloton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
71. Id.; Melissa Essary, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and
the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts,
63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 122-23 (1998).
72. Gilooly, 421 F.3d at 742.
73. Id. If the statute protects fraudulent complaints, employees could
immunize themselves by filing successive complaints with the EEOC. Id. at
742-43.
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2. Prima Facie Causation
Courts have grappled with the issue of what kind of evidence is
required in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.74
Most courts agree that in some cases, temporal proximity between
the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action
alone is sufficient to establish prima facie causation or lack
thereof.75 However, many courts disagree on how strong a role
temporal 7P6roximity should play in deciding whether to infer
causation. Some circuits adopt a strong proximity rule that views
temporal proximity as highly probative of causation.7 7 Even in the
face of other evidence, these courts tend to hold that temporal
proximity alone is sufficient to establish prima facie causation if the
employer acted "close on the heels of [the employee's]
complaints."78 Other circuits adopt either a weak proximity rule or a
case-by-case approach.79 In either of these approaches, other
evidence is often required, and thus the courts afford less deference
to temporal proximity. While it is reasonable to consider a period of
one day or one week indicative of causation, some courts have gone
as far as inferring causation when the adverse action occurred fifteen
months after the protected activity.
80
74. While one commentator stated that "[t]he [Supreme] Court held that
very close temporal proximity alone could be sufficient evidence for a prima
facie causal connection," O'Brien, supra note 16, at 750, this interpretation of
the decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), is
misleading. The Court instead stated that in cases where timing has been
enough for the plaintiff to establish prima facie causation, the temporal
proximity must be "very close." Id. at 273 (quoting O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr.
Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)). Along those lines, the Court
concluded that a twenty month period alone is not enough. Id. at 274.
Despite the Court's discussion of temporal proximity, the Clark holding
really seems to hinge on the fact that the employer had no knowledge of the
protected activity before taking the alleged adverse action. See generally id.
Thus the Court's discussion on temporal proximity is merely an application of
the underlying circuit's chosen standard, not a "holding" of the Supreme Court
on the appropriate causation standard.
75. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 772.
76. Id. at 751-53. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
77. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 751.
78. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000).
79. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 752-53.
80. Harrison v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir.
1996).
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3. Employer Knowledge
In order to recover under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer was aware of the employee's protected activity.
81
Most courts, regardless of their temporal proximity stance, require
a separate showing of knowledge in order for the plaintiff to meet
his prima facie burden. 82 However, some jurisdictions, including
the Eleventh Circuit, do not always require a separate showing of
employer knowledge. 83 In such cases, temporal proximity has a
dual purpose--"it raises an inference of causal connection" and it
"imputes knowledge of protected activity to an employer."8 4 Such
an approach makes the knowledge requirement virtually non-
existent.
4. Pretext
After the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in retaliation,
the burden then shifts to the employer to bring forth a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the employer succeeds
in proving that its action was legitimate, the burden again shifts to
the plaintiff to show that the employer's purported legitimate
reason was a mere pretext. 85 While the pretext stage of the above
McDonnell Douglas analysis is completely separate from the
plaintiff's initial prima facie burden, it too has been broadly
interpreted by the courts. Surprisingly, commentators spend very
little time analyzing the pretext stage and its role in retaliation law.
What many seem to overlook is that both the burden on the
plaintiff at the prima facie stage, and the burden on the defendant
81. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). See also Dey
v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994).
82. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 765. This is true even if only three elements
of a prima facie case are listed. The courts just view the knowledge requirement
as an implicit one.
83. Id. at 766. See, e.g., Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 242 F.3d 996,
1015 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
84. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 766.
85. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see supra
Part II.A.
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at the legitimate reason stage, are not onerous; thus the only stage
remaining to make or break a retaliation claim is that of pretext.
86
Showing that the employer's explanation is a pretext requires
"essentially a second showing of causation," though courts and
commentators differ as to what is required to meet this second
causation standard.87 Most courts require "evidence that the
adverse action would not have occurred but for the plaintiffs
protected activity."88  Courts tend to differ, however, on the
evidence required to meet this burden.
The stance courts adopt for pretext is often intimately tied to
the standard adopted for prima facie causation. Some courts with
strong proximity rules have declared that temporal proximity is
sufficient to establish causation both at the prima facie stage and at
the pretext stage. 89  Other courts adopting a strong proximity
approach give significant weight to temporal proximity, but
"consider [it] more in the context of other evidence in the
record." 90  Finally, courts with weak proximity rules consider
temporal proximity alone insufficient to establish pretext. The
plaintiff must come forth with additional evidence of pretext in
order to survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment.9'
B. The Court's Interpretation of "Discriminate Against" in
Section 704(a)
In Burlington, the Supreme Court continued the trend of
broadly interpreting the anti-retaliation provision by adopting a
86. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). See Cude &
Steger, supra note 63, at 380. The pretext stage is the last hurdle a plaintiff must
overcome in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
87. Essary, supra note 71, at 121. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
88. Essary, supra note 71, at 121. See Cude & Steger, supra note 63, at 382
("[T]o prove pretext, and thereby prevail on the merits, a plaintiff must show
'both that the reason was false, and that the discrimination was the real reason'
for the adverse employment action." (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515)). Hicks
was a disparate treatment case, but courts have seized upon the pretext standard
in the retaliation context as well. Id.
89. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 761 ("These courts have held that temporal
proximity can create a genuine issue of material fact for the jury by raising an
inference of pretext."). See, e.g., Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2002).
90. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 762.
91. Id. at 763.
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case-by-case approach to the "adverse employment action" prong
of a retaliation claim. Was the Court's decision reasonable, or was
it an unwarranted expansion of an already untethered area of law?
1. Did Congress Intendfor Section 704(a) to be Broader than
Section 703(a)?
In the Burlington decision, the majority decided that courts
should construe the anti-retaliation provision more broadly than the
anti-discrimination provision.92  The Court thereby dismissed
Burlington's argument that the two provisions should be read
together ("in pari materia").93 In other words, Burlington argued
that employer conduct actionable under § 704(a) should be
"limited to conduct that 'affects the employee's "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.""' 94 The majority
gave two main reasons why the anti-retaliation provision is not
limited to retaliatory actions in an employment setting. First, the
Court noted that if Congress had intended the sections to apply to
the same employer actions, it could have easily put the same
language in both provisions. 95  Instead, Congress left the
qualifying language of § 703(a) out of § 704(a). 96  In such
circumstances, the Court "normally presume[s] that, where words
differ as they do here, 'Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."' 97  Second, the Court
stated that the underlying purpose of the two sections differs,
further justifying the broader interpretation of § 704(a).98 The goal
of the anti-discrimination provision is to provide "equality in
employment opportunities." 99 Thus, the provision is limited to
employer conduct in the workplace. On the other hand, the goal of
92. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414
(2006).
93. See supra note 14 for statutory language of § 703(a). See supra note 15
for statutory language of § 704(a).
94. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 13; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)).
95. Id. at 2412.
96. See supra note 49 for information on sections 703(a) and 704(a).
97. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Russello v. United States, 46
U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the anti-retaliation provision is to protect employees who wish to
exercise their rights under the anti-discrimination provision.
00
Because retaliation can take many forms, which are not necessarily
workplace-related, the Court concluded that the latter provision
was intended to be broader in its application.
10 1
The Court then dismissed Burlington Northern's final
argument that it "is 'anomalous' to read the statute to provide
broader protection for victims of retaliation than for those whom
Title VII primarily seeks to protect . ."102 In doing so, the Court
compared Title VII to the National Labor Relations Act and found
that jurisprudential interpretations surrounding the NLRA anti-
retaliation provision provide broader protection than the
underlying substantive provision.'
0 3
While the Court's interpretation of § 704(a) was entirely
reasonable, an in pari materia reading would have provided the
courts and employers with an objective standard. Further, such an
interpretation would have provided employees sufficient protection
from employer retaliation while effectively limiting the provision's
coverage to only those claims that are employment-related.10 4
The majority argument, that Congress expresses its intentions
by the words it includes or excludes, actually goes against the
Court's interpretation. If Congress wanted the anti-retaliation
provision to be broader than the anti-discrimination provision, it
could have drafted such a provision.' 0 5  For example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave
Act both include an extra provision that prohibits employers from
attempting to "intimidate, coerce, threaten, or interfere with the
exercise of rights."'
10 6
100. Id. The anti-retaliation provision's primary purpose is to "[m]aintain...
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Id. (quoting Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2414.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring). See also Von Gunten v. Maryland.,
243 F.3d 858, 863 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985)).
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, 34, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405
(No. 05-259).
106. Id. at 31-32. However a valid counterargument is that any difference
between the ADA/FLMA and Title VII was unintentional. If such were the
case, this would mean that Congress intended to protect disabled individuals
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Further, if Congress meant to include non-employment-related
activity, it could have changed the language of the statute to reflect
its intent. Instead, it declined to clarify the statutory language even
though the term "adverse employment action" has been in use since
1977.107 Congress implicitly endorsed the interpretation adopted
by lower courts that the adverse action must be "employment-
related."'
10 8
The Court's determination that § 704(a)'s purpose demands a
broader interpretation than that of the underlying anti-
discrimination provision is hard to counter. Unfortunately,
retaliation can take many forms-some of which may occur
outside the workplace. However, as the Alito concurrence argued,
retaliatory acts that are taken outside the employment setting and
are severe enough to be actionable will be dealt with by other areas
of law. 10 9  Additionally, a broader interpretation of the anti-
more than victims of sexual or racial discrimination. Essary, supra note 71, at
152.
107. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir.
2004) (emphasis added).
108. Barry T. Meek, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Policy--Not Ambiguity-
Drives the Supreme Court's Decision to Broaden Title VII's Retaliation
Coverage, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 489 (1997).
"[W]hile legislative inaction may not conclusively reflect legislative
intent, one may reasonably infer that a Congress that enacted civil
rights legislation affecting the very provision in question as recently as
five years ago would have corrected such a widespread
misapprehension .... " The Court has looked favorably on Congress'
implicit ratification of judicial interpretations in the past.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2420
(2006) (Alito, J., concurring). For example, threatening to shoot an employee in
the head would constitute assault. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d
256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Shooting a person for filing a complaint of
discrimination would be an effective method of retaliation, though ... the victim
of the retaliation would have other, and more powerful, remedies than a suit
under Title VII. This would be reason for confining the provision to retaliation
that takes the form of an adverse job action.").
In fact, the majority cites only two cases in support of its contention that Title
VII should protect non-workplace retaliation. First, the court discussed Rochon
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006), which involved the FBI's
refusal to investigate death threats made on an employee that had complained.
The Court failed to realize that this case could have been addressed under a
standard limited to employment-related activity. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420
(Alito, J., concurring). Even when an agent is off duty, security provided by the
FBI to its employees would "[qualify] as a term, condition, or privilege of
1044 [Vol. 68
retaliation provision leads to the counterintuitive result set forth in
the introductory hypothetical. An individual who is punched in the
face for being a woman, as we saw in the principal hypothetical,
cannot recover under § 703(a). However, an individual that
protested discriminatory treatment of females and was punched in
the face for his complaint can recover under § 704(a).
2. Adoption of the Supposed Middle Ground-The
Reasonableness and Materially Adverse Requirements
After determining that the anti-retaliation provision is broader
than the substantive discrimination provision, the Court decided
what standard would be most appropriate for the "adverse
employment action" prong of a retaliation claim. Instead of
allowing recovery for all acts of retaliatory discrimination or
adopting an in pari materia interpretation, the Court took the
middle ground by inserting a reasonableness requirement.1 0 Thus,
the only discrimination that is actionable is that which a
reasonable employee would find adverse. Such an interpretation is
not true to the language of Title VII. "[D]iscriminate against" in §
704(a) does not have any qualifying language."'1
Thus, even though the court capitalized on the lack of
qualifying language when determining that an "employment-
related" adverse action was not required, it decided to overlook
this when concluding that a reasonableness standard was
appropriate. The Court most likely realized that if it interpreted the
employment." Id. Next, the Court wrongly portrayed Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996)--one of the cases cited to support its
argument. The Court stated that the "employer filed false criminal charges
against [a] former employee who complained about discrimination."
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412 (referencing Berry, 74 F.3d at 984, 986).
However in Berry, the employer did not file any charges against an employee.
Instead, a fellow employee exercised his legal right to file charges against Berry.
Berry, 74 F.3d at 980. The claim of the co-employee was at least reasonably
legitimate, as Berry had asked the secretary to forge the co-employee's signature
in order to negotiate the check. He then cashed the checks and kept the money.
Id. at 983-84. That the employer may have influenced the employee's decision
to file suit should be of no moment.
110. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Burlington, 364 F.3d at 810 (Clay, J.,
concurring).
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statute literally, any discriminatory treatment, no matter how
miniscule, would be actionable. In order to avoid such an absurd
result, it chose to look past the plain language. 1 2 While the Court
was wise in not allowing all discrimination to be actionable, an in
pari materia interpretation would have been more consistent with
the terms of the statute.
The Court went even further by requiring that the challenged
action be "materially adverse." In other words, the employer
action must be significant enough that "it well might have
'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination."'11 3 While a materiality requirement will
help to ensure that courts only compensate employer actions that
are intentionally discriminatory, "[t]o import a standard of material
adversity into retaliation claims is contrary to the ordinary meaning
of the language" for the same reasons that the reasonableness
requirement fails to comport with the statutory language.
1 14
3. Positive Aspects of the Broad Deterrence Approach
Even though the statutory language does not entirely support
the Court's interpretation, there are persuasive arguments
supporting the Court's decision. In light of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Faragher v. Boca Raton' 15 and Burlington Industries,16
Inc. v. Ellereth," a broad deterrence standard for retaliation cases
is arguably necessary. Under Ellereth and Faragher, in order for
employees to recover for workplace harassment by a supervisor
that does not result in a tangible employment action, they must
utilize internal grievance procedures. If they fail to do so, courts
will deny recovery. 1 7  However, if they utilize the internal
grievance procedures, they open themselves up to various forms of
112. "[A] strictly literal reading of 'discriminate against' is not a fair
interpretation of Title VII since it is unlikely that Congress intended to authorize
Title VII claims over trivial matters." Burlington, 364 F.3d at 799.
113. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
114. Glover, supra note 24, at 590. See also Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405
(Alito, J., concurring).
115. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
116. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
117. Id. at 765. This is because the employer will have an affirmative
defense to the employee's claim.
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employer retaliation that might not meet the higher standards
adopted by circuits in the past. Thus, in order to protect an
employee's right to complain about harassment and the like, a
broad deterrence standard is necessary." 8 Another benefit of the
broad case-by-case standard is that it will keep employers on their
toes. Without a bright-line rule, employers are less likely to know
what is legal for them to do in retaliation." 9  In other words,
"when you say that an act of retaliation is per se legal, it provides
safe harbor for people to do things to individuals"; a case-by-case
standard removes such a safe harbor.12
0
A judge's job is to interpret the law and apply the facts to it.
While the Court's interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision
could have gone in a number of directions, the conclusions reached
were reasonable in light of the ambiguous statutory language.
What the Court failed to consider fully is the effect such a broad
standard will have both in the legal realm and in the business
world.
C. Ramifications of the Burlington Decision and the New
Deterrence Standard
The following section discusses the consequences of the
Court's decision on the business world and on present day
litigation.
1. Burden on Employers
In Burlington, the Court faced competing Title VII goals. If
employers have guidelines to follow, they would be able to
retaliate legally in ways that fall outside of the guidelines. If
employees know that their employers are aware of the guidelines,
118. Savage, supra note 28, at 247.
119. See generally Matthew J. Wiles, Defining Adverse Employment Action
in Title VII Claims for Employer Retaliation: Determining the Most Appropriate
Standard, 27 U. DAYTON L. REv. 217, 236 (2001). "A real problem for
employers, employees, and courts has been the absence of a uniform standard
for evaluating what constitutes an adverse employment action for the purposes
of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation within the burden-shifting
framework used to evaluate these claims." Id. at 243.
120. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259).
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employees would be more deterred from accessing Title VII
remedies. Such a result goes against Title VII's purpose of
"[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms. ' ' 1 Employee deterrence in such cases presupposes
that employees are aware of their employer's familiarity with the
law. This is, however, normally not the case. On the other hand, a
standard that gives no guidance to employers also violates one of
Title VII's main purposes-"motivat[ing] employers to detect and
deter Title VII violations."'' 22 Employers cannot be dissuaded from
retaliating if they have no clear standard against which to measure
their behavior.123
In various cases over the years, the Supreme Court has
reiterated that Title VII's aim is "not to provide redress but to
avoid harm."' 124  However, the Burlington standard does not
121. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 344 (1997).
122. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (quoting
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n., 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.
dissenting)). See also Cathy Currie, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A
Criticism of the Court's Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the
Retaliation Provision of Title VII, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 1323, 1326 (2002)
("Congress intended to promote 'conciliation rather than litigation,' such that
employers or agencies would be encouraged to prevent, or address and resolve,
potential discriminatory activities before they escalated to the point of
litigation." (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764
(1998))).
The 1991 Civil Rights Act arguably changed the focus of Title VII from
preventing employer retaliation to compensating employees that were deterred
from exercising their rights. This argument is not persuasive. While the
purpose of Title VII may have expanded in 1991, the original goal of prevention
is still present. If compensation for deterring employees was meant to take the
place of the original goal of deterring employers, there would be no
compensatory and punitive damage cap.
123. A counterargument is that employers can be deterred by uncertainty. In
other words, because an employer will not know the boundaries of retaliation,
they will have an incentive to watch all of their behavior. This argument is
unrealistic because it would require employers to (1) monitor everything that
goes on in the workplace daily with a magnifying glass (thus drastically
increasing costs) or (2) take no actions against any employee that has been
involved in Title VII protected activity-no matter how legitimate the action is.
Either way, an employer's day-to-day operations would be crippled and bad
employees will be insulated simply by participating in Title VII activity.
124. Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)). See also Currie, supra note 122, at 1338
("The Supreme Court has stated that the general purpose of Title VII is a
proactive, deterrent one aimed at preventing or at least resolving problems
between employers and employees before they reach the point of litigation.")
(footnotes omitted).
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support this purpose. The standard, which is inherently vague and
subjective, does not assist an employer that seeks to "avoid
harm."' 125  In essence, the Burlington standard does nothing to
clarify this area of the law. While the circuit split has been
resolved, this standard is so fact-specific that it provides little
assurance to the lawyers, judges, and employers who sought the
Supreme Court's guidance. The standard forces employers who
seek to eliminate retaliation in their workplace to guess "which
areas of prevention demand their attention. 126 "[E]mployers will
find it impossible to achieve the Congressional goal and purpose of
Title VII: that is, to proactively eliminate discrimination from the
American workplace."'
127
The subjective element of the reasonableness requirement
makes the Burlington standard extremely unpredictable.
Employers will have to decide with whom they are dealing before
they can decide whether that individual may construe the
employer's actions as retaliatory. Before the Court's dangerous
crossover into the subjective arena, courts were generally
unwilling to consider a plaintiffs subjective characteristics in
determining whether an employer's action was an "adverse
employment action. ' ' 2 8  How are the courts supposed to apply
such a standard? How many individual characteristics should the
125. Currie, supra note 122, at 1339. The reasonableness requirement
adopted in Burlington does little to assist the courts or employers in determining
what is actionable retaliation. In determining what would be objectively
reasonable, the Court in Burlington considered a "supervisor's refusal to invite
an employee to lunch... trivial, a nonactionable petty slight." Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). The denial of a lunch
invite by a supervisor may seem trivial to some; however, the effect on the
career opportunities for those individuals that are not invited can be serious.
Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions or
Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REv. 643, 645 (1996). In
fact, a study of nine corporations by the United States Department of Labor
revealed that casual interviews over lunches, dinners, and other social occasions
made up part of their promotion practices. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON
THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE 6, 18-22 (1998). Thus, it is clear that those
things that a judge or other outsider might consider trivial, may in fact be a
strong deterrent to an objectively reasonable employee. White, supra note 27, at
1165.
126. Currie, supra note 122, at 1339.
127. Id. at 1340.
128. Doe v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1998). See, e.g., Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown
v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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courts consider? 129 It will be very easy for the subjective element
to consume the objective one. The question will no longer be
whether a reasonable person would likely be deterred, but whether
the employer action would deter an individual in this person's
circumstances. The courts will then move on to consider such
factors as how badly the person needed the job and whether the
individual has family circumstances that make the employer action
more significant than the action would have been otherwise. 130
The standard may further depend on whether a person is
participating or opposing discrimination. If an individual has an
economic interest in the case (they filed the claim and thus are
"participating"), it will take more to deter that individual than it
would if the individual has no economic interest in the outcome of
the case (they simply picket in support of another's claim, and thus
are "opposing"). 3
The materiality requirement is also of little solace to
employers. As one commentator pointed out, "[a]ny employer
129. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
130. The possibilities are endless: In Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211
(D.C. Cir. 2006), the court indicated that a wrongly delivered letter by the Postal
Service would be trivial and thus not actionable under § 704(a). However with a
subjective element, will the employer and the court have to consider whether
that person regularly receives items of great importance in the mail?
131. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006)
(No. 05-259). See Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("[I]t takes less to deter an altruistic act than to deter a self-interested
one.., the sort of response deemed immaterial to self-interested charges could
be material to others, and thus could be deemed discriminatory.").
This argument is very similar to that set forth by the Burlington concurrence.
Justice Alito stated that in order for the jury to have any hope of determining
what would deter a reasonable employee, they would need to look at the severity
of the underlying discrimination or harassment. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420(Alito, J., concurring). For example, if the person was not sexually harassed
personally (but just did not like the treatment of her fellow employees) it would
take much less to deter her than if she had personally been sexually harassed-
in which case she would not want to put up with the harassment anymore. Alito
recognized that such a result is topsy-turvy-it would give more protection to
the individuals that had not personally suffered harassment or discrimination.
Id. at 2421 (Alito J., concurring). However, he said that the other possibility-
not considering the severity of the underlying discrimination-is just as
ridiculous because it gives juries no guidance on how to apply the majority's
standard. Id. at 2420-21. The majority in Burlington clarified that courts
should not consider the severity of the underlying discrimination. Id. at 2416
(majority opinion). Therefore, whether the courts should consider a person's
participation or opposition for purposes of Title VII is debatable.
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action that prevents, is intended to prevent, or could potentially
prevent an employee from participating in an EEOC investigation
or complaint would be considered 'material' by any reasonable
court that applies this standard."' 132 Regrettably, because of the
standard's inherent subjectivity and vagueness, many actions that
occur in the normal course of business could be considered
retaliation.' 
33
A case-by-case adverse employment action standard will also
significantly impinge on employers' ability to manage their
businesses. While the legislative history surrounding § 704(a) is
minimal, Congress clearly indicated that Title VII is meant to
displace employers' prerogatives only to the extent necessary to
accomplish the objectives of Title VII. 134  Even though the
Burlington standard would help ensure that employees are not
deterred from exercising their rights under § 703(a), an
interpretation limited to employment-related adverse actions would
sufficiently protect employees, but would also strike a balance that
would allow employers adequate control over their day-to-day
business management.
A broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision
interferes a great deal with employers' freedom to operate their
businesses, as employees can use the retaliation provision to
insulate themselves from adverse employment actions. It would be
both difficult and inefficient for an employer to try to determine
whether an employment decision, legitimate or otherwise, could
potentially open them up to retaliation liability. As a result,
employers feel pressured into retaining bad employees in order to
avoid the hassles of retaliation law.
132. Rusie, supra note 12, at 405.
133. For example in large organizations, employers switch jobs around
frequently to meet business demands. Also with the growth of technology,
tightening of Internet access is prevalent. Under the new standard, either of
these could be actionable retaliation.
134. Additional Views on H.R. 7152, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2487, 2516.
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2. Inconsistent Judgments, Increased Litigation, and the
Elimination of Summary Judgment
Attorneys and judges nationwide anticipated the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington. Finally, the nation's highest Court
would decide the appropriate "adverse employment action"
standard, thereby reducing the number of inconsistent judgments.
While the Court did choose a uniform standard for the federal
circuits to apply, the potential for inconsistent judgments remains.
The Court's case-by-case standard favors flexibility over
uniformity. Inevitably, courts throughout the nation will continue
to render inconsistent judgments.
The Court's decision will also increase the number of
retaliation claims litigated. The number of frivolous claims will
increase because "[i]f the liberal standard is used in every circuit,
employees will be more likely to file a claim on the hope of getting
a sympathetic judge or jury." 3 5 Because the requirements for a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case are low, employers will be
virtually unable to dispose of such claims on summary
judgment. 136  An employer will then have to choose between
settling the claim or litigating in court.1 3 7  The effect will be
especially significant in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that formerly
employed the "ultimate employment action" standard. In those
circuits, summary judgment was common as the employer's action
had to involve "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, [or]
compensating"' 138 in order to qualify as an adverse employment
action. While many individuals would favor a system where
employers have the uphill battle, most forget that those businesses
simply pass their costs on to consumers.' 39 In the end, courts will
135. Wiles, supra note 119, at 237. See also Martha Neil, Supreme Court
Sets Broad Retaliation Test, 5 No. 25 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1 (2006).
136. During the Burlington oral arguments, Justice Scalia recognized the
implications of such a broad standard. He stated that if a black letter standard
was not adopted in the retaliation context, there would be "no way ... to get a
case dismissed before it goes to a jury ... every claim is going to be a jury
trial." Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-
259).
137. Rusie, supra note 12, at n.167.
138. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410.
139. Litigation is expensive, regardless of whether the plaintiff's claim is
frivolous or has merit. In Franchetti v. Bloomberg, L.P., 411 F. Supp. 2d 466,
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make an unnecessary number of decisions that should rightfully be
made by employers, thereby stripping employers of the ability to
run their businesses as they see fit. 40
Federal courts are already swamped with employment
discrimination cases.1 41  A case-by-case adverse employment
action standard will result in an increased number of retaliation
claims, thereby leading to the further bogging down of federal
courts and the overshadowing of substantive discrimination
claims. 142 The reputation of employment discrimination law will
also suffer. The public will question the utility of this area of law
as a result of the anticipated media coverage that will focus on the
ridiculous retaliation claims rendered under this standard.
The Sixth Circuit, in their opinion in the Burlington case, stated
that "there are no indications that the broad rules still employed in
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have opened
unmanageable floodgates to aggrieved Title VII plaintiffs."'
143
However, those circuits employ a strictly objective standard.
Distinguishing between frivolous claims and those that contain
legitimate adverse actions will not be as cut and dry when the
Supreme Court's subjective element to the reasonableness test is
taken into account.
467 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), an employer spent 1.3 million dollars defending a
retaliation claim that the trial judge concluded was "utterly baseless and
fraudulent."
140. See supra Part IV.C.1 for discussion on manager prerogatives. See also
Dana K. Scalere & Corinne D. Sorisi, The Argument for a Hybrid Retaliation
Law: A Comparative Law Study to Define Retaliation Under Title VII by
Comparing the United Kingdom, Including the European Union, Australia, and
Canada, 22 HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 751, 786 (2005).
141. Cude & Steger, supra note 63, at 410-12; Currie, supra note 122, at
1324. In 1992, the EEOC reported 11,096 claims, and by 2004 the number had
increased to 22,740. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
Retaliation, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2008).
142. As a final point, the courts should not have to be social referees. As the
Court has previously stated, "Title VII does not become a 'general civility
code."' Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation
omitted)). Application to non-workplace employer action threatens to make
Title VII just that.
143. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 813 (6th Cir.
2004).
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3. Incentive to Use Technology
The Burlington standard will open most employers up to
increased liability. 144  As a result, many employers will be
motivated to replace human labor with technology. In fact,
employers have recently begun replacing workers with technology
in retail stores such as Wal-Mart and Albertsons Grocery Store. In
any given Wal-Mart today, about one-fifth of the registers are self-
checkout lanes where customers scan their own items and pay the
machine directly using a credit card or cash. Whether employers
have been motivated by the recent trend in employment law is
uncertain, but it is this author's opinion that after the Burlington
decision, more stores are going to follow the lead of the Wal-Marts
and Albertsons of the world. As one commentator pointed out,
"[e]mployers who consistently have to pay to defend and settle
these cases may find it more economical, or even necessary, to
retain fewer employees or employ more technology to avoid
having the human element in their workforce."'
145
As a result, the Burlington standard clearly cuts against federal
policy. Each year the government struggles to keep the national
unemployment rate down. Because the standard gives employers
an incentive to utilize machinery over human labor, the
unemployment rate will inevitably increase.
4. Incentive for Employee Action
A case-by-case standard is also an incentive for employees to
complain. Under § 704(a) as it is presently construed, employees
can insulate themselves by "participating" in a Title VII
investigation or proceeding or by "opposing" illegal employment
practices. 146 While there is little room for employee manipulation
in the opposition context,1 47 the jurisprudence surrounding the
participation clause is much more lenient. An employee can file
144. Some circuits, such as the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, already
employ a broad standard. Thus the Burlington decision will not increase
liability for employers in those jurisdictions.
145. Wiles, supra note 119, at 238.
146. See supra Part IV.A.1.
147. This is because the employee has to reasonably believe the employer
conduct violates Title VII in order to be protected under the opposition clause. Id.
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fraudulent complaints under the participation clause and still be
protected for purposes of Title VII. 148  Thus, any time that an
employee fears adverse action by an employer-legitimate or
otherwise-she can make a fraudulent complaint and then "wield
her protected status as a hammer against any and all adverse events
that might affect her at the workplace.'
149
The broad standard may also serve as an incentive to
employees who seek preferential treatment. In other words, many
employers will overcompensate in their treatment of employee-
litigants. Instead of treating all employees the same, as was the
intent of Congress, some employers will treat employee-litigants
preferentially in order to ensure that the employee does not hit
them with a retaliation claim in the future.' 50 Such a result clearly
goes against the purpose of Title VII.
V. PREVENTING A TRAIN WRECK: JURISPRUDENTIAL RESPONSE
Employers will be on pins and needles if something is not done
to temper the expansive interpretations surrounding the anti-
retaliation provision. Retaliation law may be so unraveled that it
would take a legislative amendment to address all of the concerns
adequately; however, the following are a few ways the courts
could analyze the remaining retaliation issues in an attempt to
harness this area of law.
148. Id.
149. Essary, supra note 71, at 134. An employer may feel compelled to
retain an "employee simply because she has complained about discrimination.
Unfortunately, the retaliation section of Title VII may serve as a crutch for such
poor workers because employers will hesitate to risk potential liability." David
Anthony Rutter, Title VII Retaliation, A Unique Breed, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
925, 937 (2003).
150. In other words, an employer may need to "take a legitimate, perhaps
performance-based, employment action against an active employee who has just
filed a discrimination claim against him: does he take action, or does he wait?
In this situation, 'many employers feel compelled to actually accord their
employee-litigants preferential treatment, a result which is clearly at odds with
sound business management."' Currie, supra note 122, at 1344-45 (quoting
Gary D. Friedman, The Excuse Factory: How Employment Law Is Paralyzing
the American Workplace, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1997 (book review), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/nylawjoumal-theexcusefact.htm).
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A. Protected Activity
The protected activity requirement should be narrowed in two
respects: (1) the courts that have not already done so should
require plaintiffs to have a reasonable, good faith belief under the
participation clause, and (2) the courts should require voluntary
participation in order for an individual to be protected under Title
VII's participation clause.' 5
It is unnecessary to have differing standards under the
participation and opposition clauses of § 704(a). Allowing
employees that "participate" for purposes of Title VII to bring
fraudulent claims does little to further the purpose of Title VII.
While giving even those employees who know they do not have a
valid claim access to the courts definitely "[m]aintain[s] unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms," those employees are not
the individuals that Title VII should protect. 152 Further, allowing
protection for employees who file fraudulent claims leads to high
litigation costs and a waste of judicial resources. 153 Instead, only
those with valid claims, or at least individuals who have a
reasonable, good faith belief that they have a valid claim, should
receive Title VII protection. As a result, courts should apply the
same standard in both the "opposition" and "participation"
contexts.
In addition, Title VII should only protect those individuals who
voluntarily "participate." In Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company,
154
the court concluded that a co-employee who had given deposition
testimony had "participated" for purposes of Title VII even though
he was adverse to the plaintiffs interests and his testimony was
involuntary. Such a result is not what Congress had in mind. The
language of § 704(a) indicates that the purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision "is to protect the employee who utilizes the
151. While the opposition clause is viewed as being a lot broader and more
dangerous than the participation clause, in that more conduct may be considered
opposition, these suggestions would help ensure that the participation clause
does not become as broad as the opposition clause. While the statutory language
of § 704(a) indicates that Congress wanted the opposition clause to be construed
broadly, the same conclusion does not follow from the language of the
participation clause.
152. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
153. See supra note 139.
154. 120F.3d 1181, 1182 (llthCir. 1997).
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tools provided by Congress to protect his rights."' 55 This purpose
clearly implies that the employee's protected activity must be
voluntary. Furthermore, Congress seeks to prevent employee
deterrence. If the standard is what "might have 'dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of. . . ., • •156
discrimination,"' voluntariness necessarily follows. An employee
can hardly be deterred from something if he has no choice in the
matter. Therefore, Title VII should only protect voluntary
participation. 
57
B. Prima Facie Causation
Because the Burlington standard is so expansive, courts
should require more at the prima facie causation stage than mere
temporal proximity. 158 Strong proximity rules should give way to
155. Pettaway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
156. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415
(2006) (citation omitted).
157. For example,
[i]n Twisdale v. Snow, an employee participated in an internal
discrimination investigation on the side of the employer, and sought
protection under Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. The section
states that an employer shall not retaliate against an employee that
"participated in any manner in the investigation." A literal meaning
seems to suggest that the section protects an employee whose actions
assist her employer. The Twisdale court rejected this interpretation,
stating, "[p]erverse and absurd statutory interpretation are not to be
adopted in the name of literalism." Consequently, the Court held that
the employee was not protected under Title VII. The court noted that
Title VII was created for the protection of those that are discriminated
against and those that assist them, not employees who assist their
employer in investigating a claim.
Rutter, supra note 149, at 934 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (2000);
Twisdale v. Snow, 325 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Employees that have done nothing wrong or have not involved themselves in
the case at all, but have been called to testify against their will, would likely be
protected under the opposition clause. Limiting the participation clause is meant
to prevent cases like Merritt, see supra Part IV.A.1, and Twisdale, where the
individual testifying is a wrongdoer or is actively supporting the employer's
case.
158. During Burlington oral arguments, Justice Scalia recognized that
"[j]uries can have wonderful imaginations." He then went on to ask the attorney
what safeguards there are to prevent every little thing from requiring a jury trial,
and eventually being considered retaliatory. The attorney responded with
causation. Without giving it much consideration, Scalia agreed. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 41-42, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259).
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weaker proximity or case-by-case proximity rules. While the
courts can still afford temporal proximity strong weight, they
should look to the totality of the circumstances before
determining whether there is adequate causation. Courts should
consider other factors such as the "number and nature of
protected activities and adverse actions .... 59
One way to increase the plaintiffs burden at the prima facie
stage would be to require proof that the employer treated similarly
situated employees differently. In other words, if the employer
takes similar action against all employees or at least other
employees who did not take part in Title VII protected activity,
causation is not met without more.
1 60
C. Pretext
Even if the prima facie elements to a retaliation claim remain
extremely broad, the employer can still prevail as long as it can
show that its actions were legitimate and the plaintiff fails to prove
that the employer's reasons were mere pretext.' 61 To ensure that
employers retain some authority over employees, it is essential that
Commentators that support the deterrence standard also rely on the causation
requirement to justify their broad approach. "Courts need not be overly
concerned that a broad approach to adversity at the prima facie stage will
inundate courts and unduly hamper employers in the management of their
enterprises" because "retaliation plaintiffs must present evidence of a causal
connection between the challenged employer action and the protected conduct."
White, supra note 27, at 1190. Thus, it is clear that a more challenging
causation requirement is a necessary safeguard.
While the Supreme Court in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268 (2001) recognized that lower courts allow an inference based on
temporal proximity, if the issue came directly before the court, Scalia and
perhaps others may be unlikely to approve of such an inference. There needs to
be some mechanism to restrict recovery; causation is one of the only avenues
left. See also Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir.
1997).
159. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 753.
160. See Savage, supra note 28, at 226. See e.g., McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an employer is not liable
in retaliation where the adverse action was a generally applicable policy used
against all employees).
161. See supra Part II.A.
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the plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage requires more than a
showing of mere temporal proximity.'
62
If the courts consider temporal proximity sufficient to establish
both prima facie causation and pretext, plaintiffs would be able to
proceed to trial with virtually no showing of causation. In each
case, a plaintiff armed only with the timing between her protected
activity and the employer's adverse action will defeat an
employer's motion for summary judgment. 63  To avoid such a
result, courts should require plaintiffs to prove that "'but for' the
protected activity, the . . . [adverse action] would not have
occurred." 164 Courts should look at how other similarly situated
employees were dealt with, in addition to other factors relevant to a
determination of "but for" causation or pretext.' 65
D. Separate Knowledge Requirement at the Prima Facie Stage
In order to recover under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer was aware of the protected activity.' 66 However,
some circuits allow temporal proximity to serve the dual purpose
of providing an inference of causation and imputing "knowledge of
protected activity to an employer."' 67 Imputing knowledge to the
employer based on the timing of its activities alone is
unreasonable. An employer that is unaware of an employee's
protected activity should not be liable for damages simply because
they happened to take an adverse employment action against an
employee shortly after that individual filed a complaint.
162. This section proceeds on the assumption that most courts will continue
allowing temporal proximity alone to establish prima facie causation.
163. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 761. For example, in Strother v. Southern
California Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996), the
employer fired the employee one day after the employee had filed a claim of
discrimination. The employer offered numerous non-retaliatory reasons for the
adverse action; however, the court concluded that temporal proximity alone was
sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 870.
164. Alcom v. City of Baton Rouge, 851 So. 2d 1194, 1203 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2003).
165. The factors utilized are similar to those used by courts that choose to
heighten their requirements for prima facie causation. The only difference
would be that in the pretext stage, the employer's legitimate reasons should be
factored into the analysis. See Essary, supra note 71, at 149.
166. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001).
167. O'Brien, supra note 16, at 766; see supra Part IV.A.3.
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Employers that have no knowledge of an employee's protected
activity can hardly retaliate in response to that activity. Allowing
plaintiffs to circumvent the knowledge requirement only increases
the likelihood that frivolous claims will take it one more step
toward a favorable judgment.
E. Damages
In most cases, a plaintiff who cannot establish an injury will
not be able to recover. Otherwise, the plaintiff would receive a
windfall. The same is true in the retaliation context. The
Burlington Court reiterates this principle by stating that the "anti-
retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation,
but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm."' 68 Even
though proof of injury is required in order to recover for
retaliation, the court does not consider the issue of damages until
after a trial on the merits. As a result, a plaintiff that has suffered
no damage could avoid a motion for summary judgment and
proceed to trial even though it is unquestionable that he should not
recover. 
169
Whether the employer is liable and whether the employee
suffered any damage are separate inquiries. While these two
considerations are distinct, there is no reason to reserve a
determination of damages until the end of trial. For instance, tort
law requires that a plaintiff prove damages in order to establish a
prima facie case of negligence. 170 Courts should follow the same
approach in the retaliation context.
In order to establish a prima facie case in retaliation, the courts
should require a showing of (1) protected activity, (2) adverse
employment action, (3) employer knowledge, (4) causation, and
(5) damages. After the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence
168. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414(2006).
169. For example, in Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997), the
Ninth Circuit held that a negative job reference was an adverse employment
action even though the prospective employer chose to hire the plaintiff anyway.
See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000) (referencing
Hashimoto, 118 F.3d 671).
170. A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of (1) duty, (2)
breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Moore v. Matthews, 445 F. Supp.
2d 516, 522 (D. Md. 2006).
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for all five elements, the burden would then shift to the defendant
to provide a legitimate reason for its action. A prima facie damage
requirement will allow courts to dismiss baseless claims early in
the game.
What exactly is required to prove "damages" in a retaliation
case? In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 17 1 the Supreme
Court concluded that the damage suffered by the plaintiff in a
discrimination case need not be economic.172  The Court's
conclusion, however, provides little guidance in terms of damage
thresholds for recovery.' 
73
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court decided the
plaintiffs burden for recovery in a sexual harassment case.' 74 As
in the retaliation context,' 75 quantifying damages in sexual
harassment cases is extremely difficult. Despite the difficulty, the
Court knew it needed to make a decision. It concluded that while
psychological injury is not required, something more than mere
offensive conduct is required in order to recover for a harassment
claim. 176  The plaintiff must prove that she found the activity
hostile or abusive and that a reasonable person would find the
activity hostile or abusive. 177  The standard contains both a
subjective and objective element, as in the retaliation context. The
Court adopted a set of factors to assist in applying the Harris
standard including: the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.'
178
171. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
172. Id. at 64. While Meritor was a sex discrimination case, courts would
probably reach a similar conclusion in the retaliation context.
173. In other words, the decision is unhelpful in determining how much
damage should be required in order to prevail in a retaliation claim.
174. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
175. The implicit nature of the injury in retaliation cases makes the damages
question much more uncertain than in other areas of law. For example, in most
personal injury cases it is fairly easy to establish whether an injury has occurred.
However, in retaliation cases, being "deterred" from exercising rights is the
injury. Such an inquiry is inherently relative.
176. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
177. Id. at 22. "So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive .... Id.
178. Id. at 23; Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71
(2001) (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (quoting
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In order to consistently apply the standard the Court adopted in
Burlington, courts should use factors similar to those employed in
Harris.179 While the factors would not be as necessary in cases
where the action altered the terms and conditions of employment
or was an ultimate employment action, 180 the factors would be of
great help in cases where the alleged retaliatory action is more
subtle. The factors will ensure that behavior is severe enough to
warrant compensation. Even though the Harris standard was
initially created to deal with alterations to "conditions" of
employment, the reasoning is still applicable in the retaliation
context. The Court in Harris struggled to find a reasonable line
between "making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological
injury.' 181 The same issues are appearing now in the retaliation
context.
Further, some circuits that have wrestled with a hybrid of the
two areas-retaliatory harassment-have already drawn analogies
to the Harris case. In Ray, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
retaliatory harassment "is actionable only if it is 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment."' 
182
While the Harris test may not be perfect for retaliation
situations, there may not be a test that can perfectly capture the
goals of the anti-retaliation provision. Justice Scalia had a similar
concern in Harris.183 He knew that the standard left juries with
little assistance and unfettered discretion in deciding what
constitutes sexual harassment by employers. However, Scalia also
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23)). The employee's psychological well-being is also a
factor to consider. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
179. The final factor would not be applicable in all cases, as the Court has
clarified that the adverse action does not need to be employment-related in order
to be actionable.
180. In these two areas, it is much easier to show damage.
181. Harris, 510 U.S. at21.
182. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris,
510 U.S. at 21). The Ninth Circuit went on to clarify that the conduct must be
both subjectively and objectively offensive. Id. at 1245. The Ninth Circuit in
Ray also adopted the broad EEOC deterrence approach for adverse employment
actions, which is similar to the approach adopted by the Burlington Court.
183. Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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understood that there was no other alternative. 184 He realized that
people need targets in order to shape behavior, and while the
standard given in this case was not perfect, it was better than no
standard at all.1 85  The same is true in the retaliation context.
Juries should not be left with unfettered discretion to decide what
"deters" a reasonable employee. Courts in retaliation cases should
utilize factors similar to those adopted in Harris.
VI. PREVENTING A TRAIN WRECK: LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT
Burlington was a bad policy decision. The Supreme Court's
discussion of the proper statutory interpretation of the anti-
retaliation provision was very thorough; however, the Court did
not give proper consideration to the practical consequences that
would follow. 186 Employee protection is important, but the broad
deterrence standard goes too far. 187 The standard provides little if
any guidance to employers who wish to avoid becoming liable for
retaliation. In addition, the standard gives employers an incentive
to use technology instead of employees. Finally, the standard will
lead to increased litigation, inconsistent judgments, and the
elimination of summary judgment in the retaliation area.188 The
184. Id.
185. "There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all."
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1179 (1989) (referencing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
17 (1960)).
186. Normally it is the job of the legislature to make policy decisions;
however, when the statutory language is ambiguous, and a court has the ability
to go one way or the other, it becomes the courts' job to determine what the
legislature would have desired as a matter of policy.
187. Because numerous other statutes look to Title VII interpretations for
guidance, the broad interpretation adopted by the Burlington Court is especially
dangerous. See Rusie, supra note 12, at 383-84 ("Since enactment of Title VII,
Congress inserted parallel provisions into the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Pay Act of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act.").
Any negative consequence of the Burlington decision in the Title VII context
will carry over into other areas. For example, if there is a flood of litigation in
the Title VII retaliation context because of the Court's decision, there is a high
likelihood that the same result will follow in the ADA, ADEA, FLSA, and
ERISA contexts as well-as each of these statutes also has an anti-retaliation
provision.
188. Even though an employer's chance of succeeding at the summary
judgment phase is greatly decreased, there is still hope. In Reis v. Universal
City Development Partners, LTD., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1252-53 (M.D. Fla.
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effects will be most noticeable in the courts that previously utilized
the "ultimate employment action" standard such as the Fifth
Circuit and states like Louisiana that follow that court's
jurisprudence.
As Federal District Judge Stanley Sporkin poignantly stated:
The evidence needed to make a prima facie case is much
too low. It seems that almost anyone not selected for a job
can maintain a court action. It is for this reason that the
federal courts are flooded with employment cases. We are
becoming personal czars of virtually every one of this
nation's public and private institutions. The drafters of the
original legislation could never have intended the resulting
consequences from what they deemed to be necessary,
progressive legislation. It is obvious that amendatory
legislation is required. What is needed is a better screening
mechanism as a pre-requisite for gaining access to this
nation's federal court system. If an appropriate screening
mechanism cannot be devised, then at a minimum a new
Article I court should be created to hear this flood of cases.
The point is some change is urgently needed. 189
Judge Sporkin is absolutely correct. Something needs to be
done. If courts are unwilling to narrowly interpret the other
retaliation elements, the Supreme Court either needs to back away
from the standard or Congress needs to amend § 704(a).' 9' It is
unlikely that the Supreme Court will back away from its chosen
2006), the Middle District of Florida applied the Burlington standard and
decided that the denial of a transfer request was not something that would deter
a reasonable employee. The court stated that unlike in Burlington, the two job
positions in this case were almost identical. Id. at 1253. This case may also be
different because the employer merely denied an employee's request for better
conditions after protected activity rather than taking affirmative negative action
to "retaliate" for the protected activity.
189. Tschappat v. Reich, 957 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.D.C. 1997). While this
case was in the context of an age and gender discrimination claim, the same
reasoning applies in the retaliation context.
190. It is arguable that the Court could later characterize its decision that the
"adverse employment action" standard is not limited to employment-related
activity as dicta. The action that Burlington took against Ms. White was clearly
employment-related, thus the Court was not required to decide that issue in
order to decide Ms. White's case.
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standard any time soon (if ever); thus, Congress needs to amend
the statute to clarify what "discriminate" means. The amended
statute should clearly indicate that non-employment-related
activity is not within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision and
provide a specific standard to assist courts and employers in
deciding whether something constitutes an "adverse employment
action.", 1
91
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191. "Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it prescribes." Scalia, supra note 185, at 1179.
* I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor William R. Corbett
for his guidance throughout the drafting process.
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